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This paper compares U.S. and French performance with three indicators of employment
performance designed to account of job quality, measured by the incidence of low wages
and involuntary part-time employment. From each country’s main household survey for
1993-2005 by age, gender and education group, we calculate: 1) the low-wage share of
employment; 2) the underemployed (low-wage, unemployed and involuntary part-time)
share of the labor force; and 3) the adequately employed (not low paid and not involuntary
part-time) share of the working age population. France shows vastly superior performance
on all three indicators, especially for less-educated workers, and the French advantage has
grown substantially since the late 1990s. These results indicate that accounting for adequate
pay and hours of work has large effects on the assessment of cross-country labor market
performance. We recommend that indicators such as these, and not just the unemployment
rate, should have a central place in discussions of national labor market reform.
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With much of the developed world plagued by high unemployment, a great deal of
attention has been paid to the role played by poorly functioning labor markets. The
overwhelmingly dominant view is that excessive labor market regulation and overly generous
social benefits are at the root of the rigidities that, in turn, destroy jobs and produce high levels
of unemployment (OECD, 1999; IMF, 2003; Nickell et al., 2005). The yardstick for labor
market performance has been nearly exclusively the standard unemployment rate: the number
of unemployed as a share of the labor force (the employed plus the unemployed). By the mid1990s, the U.S. unemployment rate had dropped below 5 percent and the less-regulated and
low-benefit “American Model” became the model for high unemployment Europe, with France
is typically assigned to the opposite end of the performance spectrum. The consensus view is
that the French labor market suffers from not just too much regulation and too much
generosity, but from a poorly designed mix of institutions.
In this view, U.S. and French unemployment rates measure the gap in labor market
performance between a coherent employment-friendly system and an incoherent employmentunfriendly model. Figure 1 shows the standardized unemployment rates for the U.S. and
France. France’s rate is not only far higher, but the U.S. advantage has grown both over the
long-run and since 2002 (the gap narrowed between 1998 and 2002). Employment rates are
also often cited in support of pronouncements on the dismal state of French labor market
performance: the employment-to-population rate was just 62 percent for France in 2005, five
percentage points below the German employment rate and a full 10 points below the U.S. rate. 2
Conventional measures of labor market institutions designed to protect workers against
harmful effects of market pressures on wage and employment appear to strongly support this
conventional account. For example, while the U.S. minimum wage fell from $6.08 in 2000 to
$5.15 in 2006 (in 2006 dollars), the French minimum rose from $8.80 to $10.14. 3 Other
frequently invoked sources of poor French employment performance are presented in Table 1.
On each of these measures of benefits, bargaining structure, and employment regulation,
France and the U.S. lie at the opposite ends of the spectrum for developed countries.
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OECD Employment Outlook 2007, Statistical Annex, Table B.
Gross statutory minimum wages, OECD 2007: Table S.1, p 24, Taxing Wages: 2005/2006.
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Figure 1: Standardized Unemployment Rates for France and the U.S., 1982-2006
(with log trend lines)
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Source: unpublished file from the OECD and the OECD’s Employment Outlook 2007.

Table 1: Measures of Social Protection and Collective Bargaining
for the U.S. and France , 2000-2003
UB Repl.
Cash Income UB Repl.
Suppport to Rates for the Rates for the
Trade Union
4th and 5th
Working Age 1st Year as
Density
Pop. as Share Share of years as Share
(%)3
1
2
2
of APW
APW
of GDP
(%)
(%)
(%)

Collective
Bargaining
Coverage3
(%)

Collective
Bargaining
Structure
Index4

Summary
Indicator of
Strictness of
Employment
Protection
Laws5

2001

2001

2001

2000

2000

1995-2000

2003

U.S.

1.6

29

6

13

14

2

.2

France

6.0

61

27

10

90+

4

3.0

1. OECD, 2005. Society at a Glance: OECD Social Indicators, (Paris: OECD), Table EQ5 (p.61).
2. OECD, 2004. Benefits and Wages: OECD Indicators (Paris : OECD), Table 3.4. The figures show Gross
Replacement rates for Three Family Types Over a Five-Year Period, (average of 2/3 and 100% average
production worker (APW) earnings levels).
3. OECD, 2004. Employment Outlook, Chapter 3 : Table 3.3.
4. OECD, 2004. Employment Outlook, Chapter 3: Table 3.5. This is a sum of the OECD’s Centralization and
Coordination indices. Each ranges from 1-5.
5. OECD, 2004. Employment Outlook, Chapter 2: Table 2.A2.4 (overall EPL, version 1).
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These huge differences in unemployment rates and labor market institutions have lent
support to calls for

France to adopt comprehensive reforms: substantial reductions in

unemployment benefit generosity, decentralization of wage bargaining and a reduction of the
legal minimum wage, and the adoption of much less strict employment protection regulations.
According to the OECD’s Economic Survey of France (2005): “The negative influence of the
tax and benefit system on labour market incentives and the interaction of these effects with the
minimum wage and other labour market institutions are at the origin of a significant part of
structural unemployment and low participation in France” (OECD, 2005, p. 30). The
underlying explanation for the failure of the French labor market is political – too much
centralization of power in Paris and too little coordination between the “social partners”
(employers, employees and the state) (Levy, 2000).
But there are several reasons to resist the conventional single-minded focus on the
conventional unemployment rate when judging labor market performance across countries.
First, the unemployment rate, measured as the unemployed share of the labor force (the
employed and the unemployed), is just one of several measures of the adequacy of the number
of job opportunities. The employment rate (those working for pay for at least an hour a week as
a share of the working age population) is often used to complement the unemployment rate, but
for reasons given below, can provide a very different perspective on performance, especially
for prime-age workers. For this population, employment rates were actually slightly higher in
France (79.6%) than the U.S. (79.3%) in 2005. Though rarely used, another measure of the
quantity of job opportunities is the unemployment-to-population ratio. This may be particularly
appropriate for young workers, since lower employment rates (based on social norms about
who should work, low tuition charges, and the attractiveness of living with parents) will, by
construction, produce higher unemployment rates. 4 Thus, while the French youth
unemployment rate was far higher in 2005 (22.8% versus 11.3%), the difference between
unemployment-to-population rates was not very large (7.7% for France and 6.9% for the U.S.),
and just three years earlier (2002) this unemployment rate was actually substantially lower for
France (6.1% versus a U.S. rate of 7.7%) (OECD, 2006, calculated from Appendix Table B).

4

Since the unemployment rate is U/(U+E), given the number of unemployed, lower numbers of employed
workers will reduce the size of the denominator and increase the rate.
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But most importantly, the key limitation of these quantity-of-employment indicators is
that they fail to provide any indication of job quality. It seems uncontroversial that, for a given
unemployment rate, a labor market should be judged superior if it generates a lower incidence
of jobs paying very low wages or generates a mix of jobs that better matches workers’ desired
hours of work. Since a country’s economic policies, regulations and labor market institutions
are designed to affect both the quantity and quality of jobs, assessments of cross-country labor
market performance should be made with indicators that capture both dimensions of
employment adequacy. The French “model” was designed over the last half-century not only to
minimize the unemployment rate, but to limit the incidence of low pay and job insecurity,
especially for prime-age workers. It can only enhance our understanding of cross-country labor
market performance to have more comprehensive measures that reflect the adequacy of both
the quantity and quality of jobs.
This paper compares French and U.S. employment performance with three newly
developed indicators of employment adequacy (Howell, 2005b; Howell and Diallo, 2007).
These were designed to reflect three dimensions of employment performance: the adequacy of
the number of jobs (like the conventional unemployment and employment rates), the adequacy
of work hours (measured by the rate involuntary part-time work), and the adequacy of wages
(measured by the incidence of very low pay). Like standard government-produced indicators,
the employment adequacy indicators are measured with reference to three populations:
employment, the labor force, and the working age population. The three indicators are the Low
Wage Share of employment (LWS); the Under-Employment Rate (UER, which counts the
unemployed, those working involuntarily part-time, and those paid very low wages as a share
of the labor force); and the Adequate Employment Rate (AER, which measures the employed
who are not paid low wages and who are not working involuntarily part-time as a share of the
working age population).
Section 1 provides an overview of the conventional “quantity-of-employment” indicators.
Section 2 surveys recent efforts to account for labor underutilization and job quality. Section 3
outlines the construction of our SCEPA employment adequacy indicators, These indicators are
then used in Section 4 to compare French and U.S. employment performance for 1993-2005.
Section 5 concludes the paper with a call for assessments of national labor market systems to
give more weight to indicators of job quality, and a recommendation to national and
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international producers of “official” statistics to regularly produce employment adequacy
indicators of the sort we use in this paper.

1. Conventional Quantity-of-Employment Indicators
Statistical agencies in all developed countries produce labor market indicators that
break the working age population into three distinct, non-overlapping categories: the
unemployed, the employed, and those “out-of-the-labor-force.” The unemployed are “persons
over a certain specified age who are without work, available for work, and actively seeking
work” (Sorrentino, 2000, p. 4), and the conventionally defined rate of unemployment is the
unemployed over the labor force, defined as the employed and the unemployed. 5 The
“employed” are those who work for pay for at least an hour in the reference week, and the
employment rate is measured as the employed over the working age population. Working age
individuals neither unemployed nor employed are allocated to the “out-of-the-labor-force”
category. 6
Because it offers some indication of both the efficiency of the economy and how it is
performing for workers and families, the unemployment rate is the indicator used to measure
differences in labor market performance across countries.7 But by itself, the unemployment rate,
no matter how well and consistently measured over time and across countries, is a poor measure
of employment performance. A well-functioning labor market ought to not only make full and
effective use of available labor resources (“full employment”), but should provide socially
acceptable levels of worker well-being for all employed workers. For instance, a highly
developed market economy such as the U.S. could be operating at nearly “full employment”
(say, a 4% unemployment rate) despite the presence of large numbers of adult active job seekers
unable to find anything but part-time work at poverty-level wages (as could be argued was the
case in the booming late 1990s U.S. labor market). This, in turn, could lead to discouragement
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Over the last several decades the definitions of these categories across countries have converged. Because of
differences across countries in the treatment of “availability” for work, what qualifies as “active search,” and how
various groups in the population are treated (students, unpaid family members, members of the armed forces, and
so on), a great deal of effort has been devoted to standardizing (or “harmonizing”) the unemployment rate,
principally by the BLS, the OECD, the ILO and Eurostat (see Sorrentino, 2000, appendix).
6
Jones and Riddell (1999) argue that this tripartite categorization is inadequate, because of the “heterogeneity of
the nonemployed…any attempt to dichotomize the nonemployed into “unemployment” and “out-of-the-labor
force” is unlikely to full capture the complexity of labor force activity.”
7
For perspectives on this literature, see Howell, 2005a; Blanchard, 2006; and Howell et al., 2007).
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and exit from the labor market. These workers would no longer be counted as unemployed, so it
is possible that insufficient numbers of decent work opportunities could actually reduce the
unemployment rate. For example Schmitt and Wadsworth (2005) have argued that this helps
explain the decline in the U.K. unemployment rate in the 1990s.
The employment rate, though much less frequently used, has two potentially great
advantages over the unemployment rate. The first is simplicity - it does not require determining
who is really available and seriously searching for work, which adds considerable “statistical
noise” in cross-country comparisons of unemployment (Sorrentino, 2000). The second
advantage is that the employment rate automatically reflects discouraged workers (the more
discouraged workers the lower the employment rate). On the other hand, there are reasons to be
cautious about interpreting the employment rate as a measure of labor market performance.
First, since any kind of paid employment puts a person in the employment column, even if it is
for just an hour a week for less than the legislated minimum wage, the same employment rate
can mean very different qualities of employment across countries – some unquestionably better
than others.

2. Measuring Underutilization and Job Quality
Recognizing the limitations of the official unemployment and employment rates,
statistical agencies and advocacy groups in many countries have developed a variety of
alternative employment-related indicators. By far the most common are broader measures of
underutilization, which take into account those who can only find part-time work (“involuntary
part-time” workers) and those who have dropped out of the labor force because of poor job
opportunities (“discouraged” workers).
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, for example, currently publishes six “alternative
measures of unemployment and other forms of labor resource underutilization,” ranging from
the U-1, which shows “persons unemployed 15 weeks or longer” as a share of the labor force, to
the U-6, the broadest published measure of underutilization, defined as “total unemployed
persons, plus all ‘marginally attached’ workers, plus all persons employed part time for
economic reasons” as a share of the labor force plus the marginally attached (Bregger and
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Haugen, 1995, p. 23). 8 While these indicators of various dimensions of underutilization offer a
broader picture labor market performance than the conventional unemployment rate, they still
measure only the adequacy of the available quantity of employment.
The Sixteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (1998) adopted a resolution
“concerning the measurement of underemployment and inadequate employment situations.”
This document spells out different dimensions of “time-related underemployment” (willingness
and availability to work additional hours) and inadequate employment (“skill-related,” “incomerelated” and “excessive hours” related). Reflecting a growing concern with the quality of
employment, the ILO launched the “Decent Work Agenda” in 1999 and published a special
issue of the International Labour Review (ILR) in 2003 on the measurement of decent work.
According to the Introduction (ILR, 2003, p. 109), the goal of the issue was to “demonstrate the
multi-dimensional nature of decent work…(and) to appreciate the complex nature of the
concept and therefore, also, the great difficulties in evolving viable and reliable statistical
indicators for its measurement.” The five articles in this issue describe numerous indicators that
reflect many important quantity- and quality-of-employment dimensions, but they propose no
single composite indicator (or small set of indicators) that would capture key quantity and
quality dimensions of work, nor are they standardized in a way that would make them useful for
cross-country comparisons.
For example, Anker et al. (2003) identify thirty “existing, proposed, and readily usable
indicators” that measure “employment opportunities; unacceptable work; adequate earnings and
productive work; decent hours; stability and security of work; balancing work and family life;
fair treatment in work; safe work environment; social protection; social dialogue and workplace
relations; and the economic and social context of decent work” (Introduction, p. 110). However,
as the Introduction points out, their comprehensive approach poses “an obstacle to an immediate
application…” (ibid., p. 110).
Bescond et al. (2003) take a more pragmatic approach in order to produce a composite index
by selecting seven easily measured indicators: “hourly pay, hours of work, unemployment,
school enrolment, the youth share of unemployment, the male-female gap in labour force
8

Marginally attached workers are “all persons who want and are available for a job and have recently searched
for work” (Bregger and Haugen, 1995, p. 24). Discouraged workers are the marginally attached who give a jobrelated reason for not looking for work.
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participation, and old age without pension.” But their approach raises some questions. What is
the meaning of an average of indicators that have different denominators? Are cross-country
comparisons meaningful when the composite index for the countries reflects different
combinations of indicators? For example, Denmark’s decent work indicator score (6.2) is an
average of three of the seven components (the nonenrollment rate, unemployment, and the
male-female LFPR gap) while the French decent work score (8.9) is generated by averaging
four of the seven (nonenrollment rate, excessive hours, unemployment and the male-female
LFPR gap). And finally, are the results intuitively plausible? The Irish will surely be surprised
to discover that their decent work score (18.1) falls far below that of Nepal (17.6), Thailand
(14.8) and Tanzania (13.7) (Bescond et al., 2003, Table 9).
The index developed by Ghai (2003) seems straightforward in construction, relying as it
does on averaging cross-country rankings on various indicators for 22 OECD countries. The
problem with this approach is the apparent arbitrariness of what is being averaged and the
weights attached to each. Equal weights are applied to four groups of indicators: gender
disparities, employment, social dialogue, and social protection.
Reflecting the results of their survey of the employment quality literature, Davoine and
Erhel (2006, p. 9) put wages front and center. Their four “fundamental dimensions of
employment quality” are “wages, skills and training, working conditions, and gender equality.”
They use indicators of these four dimensions with a principal component analysis to compare
job quality across European countries. While they situate countries according to scores in this
analysis with various mixes of indicators, they offer no single composite index of employment
quality.
Perhaps the alternative indicators most closely related to ours are those produced in France
by the Collectif ‘Autres Chiffres du Chomage’ (ACDC, 2007). In addition to the conventional
measure of unemployment, they identify four categories of inadequate employment, data for
which can be taken directly from the French household survey. Their approach makes it
possible to generate an inadequacy-to-labor force rate (constructed like the standard
unemployment rate) and an inadequacy-to-working population rate (constructed like the
standard employment rate). The four categories of inadequately employed workers are: those
with low wage work; those in short-term or temporary jobs; the underemployed, in the sense of
over-qualification for the jobs they hold; and dangerous jobs. They find that the sum of the
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conventionally measured unemployed and these four measures of employment inadequacy
produce a total inadequacy rate for France that increased from 35 percent in 1990 to about 42
percent in 2002 (p. 10); for 2003-5 they calculate a rate of about 50 percent (a change in the
household survey makes the post-2002 figures not exactly comparable) (p. 8). Although their
standards for “adequate” employment are extremely high (even by French standards), their
approach mirrors ours. As the next section describes, in order to facilitate cross-country
comparisons and make them as simple and as noncontroversial as possible, we limit our
measure of employment quality to low pay and inadequate hours of work.
3. The SCEPA Employment Adequacy Indicators
The SCEPA indicators project (Howell, 2005b; Howell and Diallo, 2007) has aimed
to develop simple aggregate measures of labor market performance that are similar in
construction to conventional quantity-of-employment indicators (unemployment, labor
force participation, and employment rates) but incorporate relatively easily measured and
uncontroversial measures of employment quality.
The most obvious measure of employment quality is the level of wages. It is widely
accepted that a very low wage identifies a “low quality” job. Several alternative “low
wage” thresholds can be argued to be reasonable. We use a relative measure—two-thirds of
the median hourly wage for all full-time workers—rather than a quasi-absolute one, such as
the wage that would support a particular number of household members at a particular
budget level. There are three main reasons for this choice. First, the household budget
threshold is ultimately relative as well, since its determination depends on decisions about
what is an “adequate” budget for a household of a particular size (say, a basic food budget
multiplied by three), which in turn reflects prevailing social norms and a particular
economic and social context. Second, our concern is to produce indicators for assessing
labor market performance, not the adequacy of household income. For this purpose, it is the
social acceptability of an individual’s earnings that matters. And third, there are practical
considerations: the adequacy of household income requires controversial adjustments for
household size and composition, and a relative measure also greatly facilitates crosscountry comparisons. Our low-wage threshold (two thirds of the median full-time wage) is
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similar to that used by international research organizations like the OECD (it is also
common to identify the “poverty wage” as one-half the median wage).
It also seems fairly uncontroversial to characterize “time-related underemployment”
as an indicator of poor labor market performance. The most common measure of this is
“involuntary part-time employment” – workers who would prefer to work more hours but
cannot due to inadequate employment opportunities. So we assume that the greater the
involuntary part-time share of jobs, the worse the labor market performance.
We do not explicitly account for discouraged workers for two reasons. First, it
appears to be poorly measured in the U.S. and, in any case, the official numbers are very
small (see Howell, 2005b). In addition, there are concerns about comparability across
countries. 9 It is also the case that one of our three indicators captures discouraged workers
(the Adequate Employment Rate – see below). While efforts to include other dimensions of
inadequate employment, like employer provided health benefits (see Schmitt, 2008) or job
precariousness and physical working conditions, are important and may be adequately
measured in a single country, cross-country comparisons of these kinds of job
characteristics are both extremely difficult and controversial (for a new ambitious effort,
see Leschke et al, 2008).
The official unemployment and employment rates are designed by distinguishing
between two parts of a given population: the unemployment rate starts with the labor force
and distinguishes the employed from those without a job but who are actively looking for
work; the employment rate sets the employed against the entire working age population.
Our goal has been to incorporate two simple measures of job quality using the same
approach. We distinguish “low” wages from the full wage distribution and “involuntary”
part-time workers from all other employed workers.
The SCEPA employment adequacy indicators are defined with reference to three
different populations: total wage and salary employment 10, the labor force, and the working
age population. The low wage share of employment (LWS) measures the share of wage and
salary employees paid low wages. The underemployment rate (UER) measures the share of
the labor force that is unemployed, working involuntarily part-time, or paid low wages; and
9

Even if the definition is the same, who will be tabulated as “discouraged” will reflect the kind of safety net that
is available.
10
We exclude the self-employed (see section 4.1).

12
the adequate employment rate (AER) measures the share of the working age population
employed in wage and salary jobs and not working involuntarily part-time or paid low
wages.
The interpretation of the LWS and UER as measures of employment performance is
straightforward, and just like the unemployment rate: all else equal, performance is
superior if the low wage share of employment and the underemployed share of the labor
force is lower. But just as a higher employment rate is not necessarily a measure of better
performance (Section 1), so a higher adequately employed share of the population does not
necessarily indicate “better” performance. To take an extreme example, even if all
employed workers are “adequately” employed, social norms and the share of tuition costs
borne by students in a country (like France) may affect employment rates for enrolled
students, and thereby affect the overall adequate employment rate. Just 1.9 percent of
French 15-19 year olds enrolled in school were employed in 2005, compared to 22 percent
of similar American students and 43 percent of Dutch students (OECD, 2007c, Table
C4.2a). Since the AER is measured against the population, the higher U.S. employment
rates among students will automatically generate higher adequate employment rates as long
as any of the jobs that make up the difference (in this case, the 20.1 percentage points: 22
minus 1.9) qualify as “adequate.” The same holds for older workers in countries with
retirement set at relatively young ages, which will reduce employment rates, but reflects
social choices and not labor market performance. For these reasons, the AER may be most
useful as a measure of performance for prime-age workers.
4. French and U.S. Employment Performance with the SCEPA Indicators
4.1 Data
The data used to generate the labor market indicators for the U.S. and France were
generated from each country’s basic household survey – the Current Population Survey for
the U.S. and the Enquête Emploi for France. The U.S. indicators have been computed back
to 1979 (see Howell and Diallo, 2007). Due to limitations in the French data, we were able
to cover just 1993-2005 for France.
The data used to compute the SCEPA indicators are from CPS ORG Uniform Data File
produced by the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). The underlying data
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for the CEPR ORG extracts is the CPS "Annual Earnings File" from the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) from 1979 to 2002. From 2003 on, the underlying data for the
CEPR ORG extracts comes fro the monthly CPS Basic files, which are available in the
public domain (www.bls.census.gov). CEPR makes available the program used to produce
the CEPR org extracts on the CEPR webpage (www.cepr.net). Our key measure is low
T

T

earnings and most low-wage workers are paid hourly. A major advantage of the CPS ORG
data is that for nonsupervisory workers the hourly wage is generated directly by the
questionnaire, not calculated from weekly or annual earnings from estimated hours and
weeks worked.
The French data come from the French Labour Force survey (Enquête Emploi)
implemented by the INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques)
and disseminated by the Centre Maurice Halbwachs. The survey was annual before 2003
and was held in March, except the years of the population census when it was held in
January simultaneously with the census (e.g. 1999). Unlike our wage figure for the U.S.,
the French hourly wage is calculated by dividing monthly wages by monthly hours.
The one fundamental difference between our measures and the official unemployment
and employment rate measures is that we include only wage and salary workers. The selfemployed are excluded for both countries since our main quality measure, the hourly wage,
is not available for them. 11

4.2 Low Wage Thresholds
Figure 2 shows median and mean hourly wages for full-time wage and salary workers in
the U.S. from 1979 to 2006 (in 2006 dollars). The median rose slowly from $14.09 in 1979
to $15.28 in 1997, increased steadily to $16.78 over the next five years (the Clinton boom),
and has fallen slightly since (to $16.48 in 2006).
The mean hourly wage appears as the trend at the top of Figure 2. It began at a little
more than $2 higher than the median in 1979 (14 percent higher than the median), rose to
$18.32 in 1987 (20 percent higher) and to $20.30 in 2002 (21 percent higher), before
falling back to $19.25 in 2006 (17 percent higher). The growing gap between the mean and
11

The self-employed shares of total employment for France and the U.S. and their trends over time are broadly
similar. For France, the self-employed share fell steadily from 12.8% in 1990 to 8.9% in 2006 (INSEE). For the
U.S., this rate fell from 8.5% in 1990 to 7.5% in 2003 (Hipple, 2004, Table 1).
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the median through 2002 reflects the rising share of income going to the top of the earnings
distribution. The trend shown in bold at the bottom of Figure 2 is our low wage threshold—
two-thirds of the median full-time hourly wage. This increased very gradually from $9.79
in 1979 to $10.18 in 1997, rose more rapidly to $11.19 in 2002, and then dropped back to
$10.99 in 2006.

Figure 2: Median and Mean Real Hourly Wages for Full-time U.S. Workers, 1979-2006
(16+, 2006$)
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source: authors’ calculations from the CPS (see Howell and Diallo, 2007)

Comparable wage trends for France are shown in Figure 3 (in 2006 Euros). The most
striking difference with the U.S. trends is the rapid rate of French wage growth. For
example, the median real hourly wage rose 38.8 percent from 1997 to 2005, while the U.S.
real median rose by less than 8 percent from 1997 to 2006. The differential is perhaps even
more striking since 2002: a gain of 11.3 percent for the French median and a decline of 1.8
percent for the U.S. median.
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Figure 3: Median and Mean Real Hourly Wages for Full-time French Workers, 1993-2005
(16-64, 2006€)
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4.3 Aggregate Results
Figures 4-6 show the low-wage share of (wage and salary) employment (LWS), the
underemployed share of the labor force (UER), and the adequately employed share of the
working age population (AER) for 1993-2005 for the U.S. and France.
Figures 4a and 4b show that, for both men and women, the U.S. has had a
substantially higher incidence of low wage employment than France, a gap that has
widened considerably since 2001. The low wage share of employment for U.S. men (1664) was stable at 23-24% between 1993 and 2005, at a level twice as high as the French
male LWS in 1993 (11.75%) and 2.6 times as high in 2005 (9.2%). Similarly, the LWS for
U.S. women was stable at 35-36 percent, while the French female LWS fell from 22.5
percent in 1993 to around 19.5 percent in 1999-2002, and then fell again sharply to 16.2
percent in 2005.
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Figure 4: The Low Wage Share of Employment for France and the U.S.,
1993-2005 (age 16-64)
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Figures 5a and 5b report male and female underemployment rates (UERs) since 1993
for each country (unemployed, low paid, and involuntary part-time workers as a share of
the labor force, 16-64). With a lower rate of unemployment but a much higher incidence of
low-wage employment, our UER indicator is again much larger (worse) for the U.S.
Figure 5a shows that the French male UER fluctuated between 22 and 25 percent from
1993 to 2000 and has been fairly stable at around 20 percent since. In contrast, the U.S.
male UER was over 31 percent in 1993, fell to 26.6 percent in 1999, and has fluctuated
around 30 percent since. This translates into a U.S. UER disadvantage that rose from 13
percent in 1999 (26.6% compared to 23.5%) to 45.3 percent in 2005 (29.2% compared to
20.1%).
The underemployment story is broadly similar for French and U.S. women. Figure 5b
reports that while U.S. female UERs have been stable around 40 percent since 1997, the
French female UER fell from just under 39 percent in 1997 to 32.1 percent in 2005. This
translates into a U.S. female underemployment rate gap that increased from just 5 percent
(3 percentage points) in 1997 to almost 24 percent (7.6 points) in 2005.
As noted above, the interpretation of the Adequate Employment Rate (AER) as a
measure of labor market performance may be somewhat different for young and prime-age
workers, since it is not necessarily the case that a higher employment rate for students is
necessarily better, even if the jobs qualify as “adequate.” It is also the case that social
choices lower substantially the employment rate for older workers (55-64) – for many
French workers the “normal” (and legal) retirement age is 60. For these reasons, Figure 6
presents the AER results for U.S. and French men and women in two panels, the working
age population (16-64) and the prime-age population (25-54).
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Figure 5: The Underemployment Rate for France and the U.S., 1993-2005
(unemployed, low paid and involuntary part-time workers
as a share of the labor force, age 16-64)
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Figure 6a shows that for both men and women, French and U.S. AERs have bee quite
similar since 1993. Evidently, higher employment rates for U.S. youth and older workers
have largely offset the much larger U.S. incidence of low wage jobs. There is a much
greater gap by gender than by country: the French and U.S. male AERs range from 55 to 60
percent, while the female AERs for each country have fluctuated between 35 and 43
percent. It is also notable that the relative performance of the two countries on this indicator
switched between 2001-2002 for both men and women. From 1993 to 2001, U.S. men and
women show a higher (“better”) rate of adequate employment, but from 2002 to 2005 the
AER for French men and women has been superior. The figures for both U.S. men and
women show a declining rate of adequate employment between 2001 and 2005 (from 60.1
to 57.1% and from 42.7 to 41.1%), whereas both French men and women show long-term
improvement (between 1997 and 2005, from 54.9 to 58.9% for men and from 36.2 to
43.1% for women).
Panel B shows that adequate employment rates have consistently been higher for
French men, and the gap has grown noticeably since the late 1990s, from a few percentage
points in 1999 to about 8 points in 2005 (78% and 70.3%). The prime-age female AERs
were nearly identical from 1993 to 2000 and have diverged steadily since, to over 6
percentage points in 2005 (56.4% and 50%). The higher prime-age AERs for France
relative to the U.S. shown in Figure 6b, implies that the close similarity of these rates for
the full population in Panel A reflects the fact that low enrollment rates for young French
workers and older workers pulls down the French AER for the full 16-64 age group.
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Figure 6: Adequate Employment Rates by Gender for France and the U.S., 1993-2005
(employed workers not paid low wages and not involuntarily part-time
as a share of the population)
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4.4 Results by Age, Gender and Educational Attainment
We have calculated these three indicators for male and female workers by education
(less than high school, high school, some college, and college or more) and age (16-64, 2554) for 1993-2005. The next three sub-sections (one for each of the indicators) highlight
some of the key findings. The full set of results appears in the Appendix Tables. It should
be noted that “employment” always refers to wage and salary workers (for reasons given
above, the self-employed are not included).

4.4.1 The Low Wage Share of Employment (LWS)
Figure 7 shows large disparities between U.S. and French low-wage employment
shares in 2005, particularly for those with less than a high school degree, shown on the left
side of the figure. Starting from the left, Figure 7 shows that 10.7 percent of employed
French men (16-64) with less than a high school degree were paid low wages in 2005,
compared to about 58 percent of similar U.S. men. The incidence of low-wage employment
for prime-age male workers with less than a high school degree was 7.1 percent for France
and 47.6 percent for the U.S. in 2005.
For less-educated female workers, the France-U.S. low-wage differential is even
larger: 81 percent of U.S. women (16-64) with less than a high school degree were
employed in low-wage jobs in 2005 compared to about 23 percent of French women. The
France-U.S. low-wage gap for prime-age women was also huge: 21.2 percent for French
women and 75 percent for U.S. women.
The right side of Figure 7 shows large French-U.S. low-wage share disparities for
workers a high school degree. About 28 percent of U.S. employed men with a high school
degree were paid low wages, compared to less than 11 percent for similar French men. For
female workers the gap is even larger: over 46 percent for U.S. female high school level
workers and less than 15 percent for similar French women.
Figure 7 also shows that having a high school degree has large effects on the
incidence of low wages for all groups except French men. For the total 16-64 population,
the low-wage rate drops from 57.9 percent for U.S. men without a degree to 28.1 percent
with a degree, and from, from 80.9 to 46.2 percent for U.S. women. Having the equivalent
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of a high school degree also makes a difference on average for French women: the LWS
drops from 22.9 percent without to 14.5 percent with a degree. On the other hand, our
results show that for French men, the rate is essentially identical for all workers (10.7 and
10.8 percent) and drops only modestly for prime-age workers (7.1 to 6.2%). The much
higher French minimum wage and much greater collective bargaining coverage are the
most likely reasons for the far lower incidence of low wages in France, and for the much
more modest differences in the low wage rate for those without and with a high school
degree in France, particularly for men.

Figure 7: The Low-Wage Share of Wage and Salary Employment for Less-Educated
Male and Female Workers in France and the U.S., 2005*
(less than high school and only a high school degree, ages 16-64 and 25-54)
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Annual series of the low wage share of employment from 1993 to 2005 by gender,
age and education show particularly striking differences between French and U.S. labor
market outcomes (not shown). 12 In general, the French low wage shares have declined
(improved), especially since 2002, whereas the U.S. low-wage rates have tended to remain
stable or to increase (worsen). For example, the low wage share for all French men (16-64)
with less than a high school degree fell from 14-16% in the 1990s to less than 11% in
2004-5, while the comparable U.S. figures fluctuated between 56 and 58%. The incidence
of low-wage employment for U.S. men with some college education was more than twice
the rate for French men with less than a high school degree (22.7% and 10.7%). The results
for women were equally dramatic. Over the 1993-2005 period, French women with just a
high school degree had low-wage rates (14-17%) that were about half that of U.S. women
with some college (34-36%) and only slightly higher than U.S. women with at least a
college degree (12-15%).
Unlike the case for the U.S., the low-wage rates are quite similar for French men and
women, as well as for those with just some college and those with at least a college degree.
For example, while low-wage rates for French prime-age men and women with some
college in 2005 were 3.6 and 4.5 percent, comparable U.S. rates were 14 percent for men
and 27.5 percent for women.

4.4.2 The Underemployed share of the Labor Force (UER)
Our underemployment rate results for France and the U.S. by gender and age group
for 2005 are shown in Figure 8. The UER is measured as the number of workers who are
unemployed, low paid, or working involuntarily part-time as a share of the labor force.
Figure 8 shows that on this measure of employment performance, the French labor market
is also consistently superior, reflecting the fact that higher French unemployment is offset
by a much lower incidence of low-wage employment in France. The largest French
advantage was for those with less than a high school education (reflecting the effects of the
high French minimum wage) and the smallest for men with a high school degree (since
their wages are higher and less impacted by the legal minimum).

12

This table is available from the authors.
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Starting from the left, French men with less than a high school degree have a UER
just under 23 percent, compared to a U.S. rate of almost 64 percent. For prime-age men
without a high school degree, the difference between French and U.S. less-educated men is
similarly striking: about 18 percent for French men and 53 percent for U.S. men. The right
side of the figure shows that the French advantage is also substantial for men with a high
school degree: a 20.7% underemployment rate, compared to 33.8% for U.S. men. Among
prime-age men, the French and U.S. UERs are 15% and 26%.
French-U.S. UER differentials are extremely large for women as well. The French
female underemployment rate was 41 percent in 2005, far below the 84 percent rate for
U.S. women and also substantially below the 64 percent rate for U.S. men. For prime-age
women, the French underemployment rate is nearly half that of the U.S.: 24.1 compared to
45.7 percent. Interestingly, prime-age French women show only slightly lower
underemployment rates than the full 16-64 age group (41.3 vs 39.4%).
Like the results for the low-wage share (figure 7), Figure 8 shows that a high school
degree has little impact on the underemployment rate for French men (20.7% rather than
22.6%). For U.S. men the degree makes a much bigger difference for the UER: 34 percent
with the degree versus 64 percent for those without it (dropping from about 64 to 34
percent (and 53 to 27% for prime-age U.S. men). French women with a high school degree
had substantially higher underemployment rates in 2005 than their male counterparts
(30.1% compared to 20.7%), but this was far below the U.S. female rate (50.7%) and even
slightly below the U.S. male UER (33.8%).
Like the results for the low-wage share, changes in the France and U.S. UERs over
the 1993-2005 by gender, education and age are striking (not shown, available upon
request). For example, among prime-age men, the U.S. underemployment rate for those
with some college ranged between 18.4 and 20.3 percent between 2002-5, slightly above
the rates for French men with less than a high school degree (17.5-18.6%). While the UER
for U.S. women with some college (16-64) fluctuated around 40 percent between 1993 and
2005, the UER for French women with less than a high school degree fell from 48-49
percent in 1994-7 to just over 41 percent in 2004-5. Among prime-age workers, only for
those in the top educational group do French and U.S. workers (both men and women)
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show roughly similar underemployment rates (10-11% for French and U.S. men; 15-16 %
for French and U.S. women).

Figure 8: The Underemployment Rate* for Less-Educated
Male and Female Workers in France and the U.S., 2005
(less than high school and just a high school degree, ages 16-64 and 25-54)
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4.4.3 The Adequately Employed Share of the Population (AER)
As the share of the working age population employed with “adequate” jobs (not paid
low wages and not working involuntarily part-time), a higher AER can be viewed as an
indication of a better performing labor market. This is certainly a reasonable interpretation
for prime-age workers but as noted above this is not necessarily so for youth and older
workers. For this reason, we will focus on the results for prime-age workers.
Figure 9 shows that for the two least educated groups (less than a high school degree
and just a high school degree), the share of the working age population with adequate jobs
was far higher in France than the U.S. in 2005 for both men and women. The left side of
the figure shows that over 75 percent of prime-age French men without a degree had
adequate jobs in 2005, compared to less than 38 percent for similar U.S. men. For prime-
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age women without a degree, the French advantage was greater by a factor of four: 45.1
percent with adequate employment compared to only 11 percent for U.S. women. The right
side of the figure shows that the gaps were also substantial for those with just a high school
degree: 80 to 64.4 percent for prime-age men and 62.8 to 38.5 percent for prime-age
women.
Figure 9: The Adequate Employment Rate* for Less-Educated
Male and Female Workers in France and the U.S., 2005
(less than high school and only a high school degree, ages 16-64 and 25-54)
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The AER differentials for the full 16-64 age group are similar, with one exception French and U.S. male high school graduates had about the same adequate employment rate
(55.1 and 54.2%) in 2005. This probably reflects a much lower (standard) employment rate
for French male youth than U.S. youth with just a high school degree, which offsets the
much higher incidence of low wage employment for U.S. men with just a high school
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degree. 13 Detailed results by age, education and gender for 1993-2005 are available upon
request.
5. Conclusion
This paper was motivated by the view that cross-country comparisons of labor market
performance should take employment quality into account. The policy significance of not
doing so can be substantial, since rolling-back or dismantling policies and institutions on
the presumed grounds that these actions will reduce the aggregate unemployment rate may
have substantial consequences the quality of employment for the, say, 90-95 percent of the
labor force that is not unemployed. Recent research has established how successful France
has been at limiting the incidence of very low pay, even compared to other European
countries. For example, while Germany and the Netherlands had low pay rates of 20.8 and
17 percent in 2002, France’s rate was just 12.7 percent (Caroli and Gautie, 2008, Table
2.7).
We compare French and U.S. labor market performance between 1993 and 2005 with
three labor market indicators designed to provide a more comprehensive perspective on
national performance by taking into account not only the adequacy of the quantity of job
opportunities (as measured by conventional unemployment and employment rates), but also
opportunities for jobs with adequate pay and hours of work. We use three adequate
employment indicators: the low wages share of employment (LWS), the under-employed
share of the labor force (UER), and the adequately employed share of the working age
population (AER). In sharp contrast to the picture we get from the conventional quantity
measures, which show much poorer performance by France (higher unemployment rates
and lower employment rates), the adequate employment indicators show the U.S with far
worse labor market performance.
These results underscore the importance of not conflating labor market performance
with a country’s relative standing on the conventional unemployment rate. This is not
13

This is the likely explanation, since standard employment rates for U.S. and French men ages 25-64 with upper
secondary education are fairly similar (the French rate is actually higher, 81.4% compared to 78.6% [OECD 2006,
Appendix Table D) and we know that the low wage share of employment for both less than high school and high
school degree men ages 25-54 are far higher for the U.S. than France (Appendix Table A-2). So the offsetting
factor appears to be that the large employment rate gap for young workers (29.3% for French and 55.2% for U.S.
young men in 2005) (OECD 2006, appendix Table C).
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simply an academic issue of “getting it right.” Policy makers across the OECD countries
have been urged to reform national institutions and policies on the grounds that less
regulation, less benefit generosity, and more decentralized bargaining will improve
employment performance and overall worker well-being, because these reforms will reduce
the national unemployment rate. Whether this is correct is a matter of debate, but what does
not seem debatable is that national policies and institutions should be designed to achieve
the best possible overall employment performance, which requires that a high priority be
placed on adequate pay and hours of work. To help keep adequate pay and hours at the top
of the policy agenda, it would be a simple matter for statistical agencies to regularly
publish, along with the conventional unemployment and employment rates, employment
adequacy indicators such as the ones used in this paper.
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